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 My Way or No Way: The American 
Reluctance for Trans-Territorial Public Law 
William Funk* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the topics for this symposium is “trans-territorial administrative 
law.”  It is said that public law is in the process of de-territorialization; that 
many of the phenomena discussed in the current context of modern adminis-
trative law (e.g., agency-networks, governance, privatization, globalization) 
have led to a lessening of the principle of territoriality in public law; and that, 
indeed, in a digital age, the principle of territoriality seems much less impor-
tant to an increasing sector of regulation of activities (e.g., media, telecom-
munications, banking, insurance, internet, crime prevention, etc.).  De-
territorialization is probably most evident in trade law, where the World 
Trade Organization (WTO)1 has become the de facto ruling body regarding 
national barriers to international trade.  Nevertheless, de-territorialization is 
hardly limited to trade, as the International Criminal Court (ICC)2 reflects.  
While the United States has been a leader with regard to some aspects of this 
globalization of public law, such as in the formation of the WTO, it has also 
failed to participate in other aspects, such as in the creation of the ICC.  What 
explains this American ambivalence? 
II. THE UNITED STATES’ VIEWS ON DE-TERRITORIALIZATION 
The history of the United States, from George Washington’s farewell 
address3 to at least the beginning of World War II, reflects a nation distancing 
itself from attachments with foreign nations.  The failure of the United States 
to ratify the League of Nations and participate in its activities is the paradigm 
of that isolationism.  The Allies’ victory in World War II, on the other hand, 
and the supremacy of the United States among the Allies, assuaged Ameri-
cans’ historic fears of becoming involved in international affairs in light of 
the imagined benefits of international organizations – hence, the United Na-
  
 * Lewis & Clark Distinguished Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law School. 
 1. See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/ (last visited Mar. 
20, 2013). 
 2. See INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icc-cpi.int/EN_Menus/icc 
/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 20, 2013).  
 3. Washington’s Farewell Address 1796, YALE LAW SCHOOL, 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/washing.asp (last visited Mar. 20, 2013) (“It 
is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign 
world.”). 
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tions, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade.4 
The United States’ leadership in the creation of these organizations, 
however, was aligned with the United States’ perceived ability to both domi-
nate these entities and to be their primary beneficiary.  As the leader of the 
“Free World” and the unchallenged economic master of the world, the United 
States stood to gain the most by creating global organizations that reflected its 
view of the world.  However, despite the fact that the United States is now the 
undisputed predominant military power in the world, enabling it to project 
military power to every continent, it has seen its leadership of the “Free 
World” in many respects decline with the rise of the European Union (EU) as 
a political entity of its own.  Moreover, with the EU surpassing the United 
States in Gross Domestic Product and China closing in,5 the economic su-
premacy of the United States can no longer be taken for granted.  Thus, it 
should be no surprise that the United States’ enthusiasm for undertaking new 
international obligations – when it would not be the unchallenged leader – 
would lessen.   
Indeed, as its influence waned, the United States even began to cut its 
financial support of the United Nations.6  In 1985, the United States withdrew 
from the general jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ),7 and 
in 2005, it withdrew from the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes.8 
The United States’ efforts now to avoid involvement with international 
obligations or organizations are further evidenced by the number of interna-
  
 4. The United Nations was founded in 1945 by 51 nations.  UN at a Glance, 
UNITED NATIONS,  http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/index.shtml (last visited Sept. 24, 
2013).  NATO was created in 1949 by the United States, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, France, the United Kingdom, Canada, Portugal, Italy, Norway, Den-
mark, and Iceland.  NATO, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO (last vis-
ited Sept. 24, 2013).  The GATT was signed and put into effect in 1947 by 23 coun-
tries.   General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org 
/wiki/General_Agreement_on_Tariffs_and_Trade (last visted Sept. 24, 2013). 
 5. The World Factbook, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/fields/2195.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2013).  
 6. See MARJORIE ANN BROWNE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33611, UNITED 
NATIONS SYSTEM FUNDING: CONGRESSIONAL ISSUES 2 (2013), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33511.pdf.   
 7. Letter and Statement Concerning Termination of Acceptance of ICJ Compul-
sory Jurisdiction from George P. Shultz, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Secretary General, of 
Int’l Court of Just. (Oct. 7, 1985), reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1742 (1985). 
 8. Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Concern-
ing the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, n.1, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=III-
8&chapter=3&lang=en (last visited Mar. 20, 2013) (the protocol provides for jurisdic-
tion in the ICJ when any state party to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 
seeks to sue another state party for violating it). 
2
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tional conventions the United States has failed to ratify in recent years: The 
Convention on the Rights of the Child,9 the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women,10 the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,11 The Convention on the Prohibition, 
Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on 
Their Destruction,12 The Kyoto Protocol,13 The International Criminal 
Court,14 and the Convention on the Law of the Sea.15  Even when the United 
States has ratified a convention, it has often established reservations, under-
standings, or declarations that fundamentally undermine the convention.  For 
example, when the United States ratified the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights,16 it declared that the treaty was not self-executing and 
therefore had no domestic legal effect.17  This declaration led the Human 
Rights Committee of the UN in 2006 to criticize the United States for mate-
rial non-compliance.18  While the United States does not always explicitly 
explain the reasons for not ratifying (or fully adopting) these conventions, a 
continuing concern has been that ratification would be inconsistent with the 
sovereignty and constitutional structure of the United States.19  That is, there 
is a belief that the international bodies that implement and interpret these 
conventions should not be empowered to define the rights of Americans or to 
alter the social and economic priorities established by their elected represen-
  
 9. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. res. 44/25, annex, 44 U.N. 
GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 167, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989) (Sept. 2, 1990). 
 10. United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimina-
tion Against Women, Sept. 3, 1981, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13. 
 11. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 
2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Jan. 3, 1976).  
 12. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Trans-
fer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Mar. 1, 1999). 
 13. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, U.N. Doc.  UNFCCC/CP/1997/L.7/Add.1 (Feb. 16, 2005). 
 14. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court , U.N. GAOR, 53d 
Sess, U.N. Doc.A/CONF. 183/9 (1998). 
 15. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 397. 
 16. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171. 
 17. 138 CONG. REC. S4783 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992) (stating for the record five 
reservations, understandings, and declarations attendant to the United States Senate’s 
ratification). 
 18. See Rep. of the Human Rights Comm., 60th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/61/40, at 58-
67; U.N. GAOR, 60th Sess., Supp. No. 40 (2006), available at http://www.ccprcentre 
.org/doc/ICCPR/AR/A_61_40_vol.I_E.pdf.  
 19. See, e.g., Jim Abrams, Disability Treaty Downed by Republican Opposition, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 4, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12 
/04/disability-treaty_n_2238181.html (reporting Republican opposition to disability 
treaty because it could pose a threat to U.S. national sovereignty). 
3
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tatives.  For example, the Human Rights Committee of the Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights found that, among other faults, the United States failed to 
provide adequate political rights to the citizens of the District of Columbia, 
failed to provide adequate civil rights to those imprisoned in maximum secu-
rity prisons, and failed to eliminate de facto segregation in schools.20  Clearly, 
decisions as to whether citizens of the District of Columbia should be able to 
be represented by Senators and Congressman, what civil rights hard core 
criminals should have in prison in the United States, and how the public 
schools in the United States should be organized and funded should be made 
through the American political and legal process, not dictated by an interna-
tional organization made up of representatives from foreign nations.   
It is undeniable that “conservatives” in the United States have a greater 
antipathy to foreign organizations and their ability to influence policy in the 
United States, much less their ability to dictate law in the United States.  At 
the present, the nation is split between the liberal/social political views gener-
ally held by Democrats, which are not generally at odds with the political and 
social views of other economically developed nations, and the individualis-
tic/religious-moral views generally held by Republicans, which are uniquely 
American.  This uniquely American individualistic/religious-moral view is 
epitomized by the country’s continued support of the death penalty and its 
embrace of the individual right to have handguns. Moreover, there is still 
deep disagreement about the role of the federal government as compared to 
that of the states.  Therefore, it is not surprising that there is even greater de-
bate about the role of any international government as compared to the United 
States government.   
It is not only the political branches of government that reflect a distrust 
of foreign entities dictating law to the United States, but also the courts.  
Some members of the Supreme Court of the United States have famously (or 
infamously) expressed their unwillingness to look to foreign law to guide 
their decisions interpreting the Constitution or federal statutes.21  This unwill-
ingness reflects those members’ views that interpretation of the Constitution 
must be according to its original meaning, which would not include the cur-
rent views on similar matters held by other nations and their courts.  More 
directly, the Supreme Court of the United States recently had occasion to 
address the effect of decisions of the ICJ on American law.  In Medellin v. 
Texas, a Mexican national was arrested, tried, convicted, and sentenced to 
death in a Texas court, all without having been informed of his right to seek 
assistance from the Mexican consul and without the consul having been in-
  
 20. Rep. of the Human Rights Comm., 60th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/61/40, at 62, 65, 
67.  
 21. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing that the Court should not eliminate criminal sanctions on certain behav-
ior because foreign nations have done so); Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 (2002) 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (positing that the Court “should not impose foreign moods, 
fads, or fashions on Americans.”). 
4
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formed of Medellin’s arrest.22  Both of these omissions are violations of the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations to which the United States is a 
party.23  Medellin, however, only raised this issue in his motions for post-
conviction relief, not in the trial or on direct appeal.24  As a result, under long-
standing Texas law, his motions were dismissed on the grounds that the claim 
was procedurally defaulted because they were not raised on direct review.25  
The ICJ, however, in a case brought by other Mexican nationals similarly 
denied their rights under the Convention and similarly barred from raising the 
issue in motions for post-conviction relief, held that the United States was 
“required to review and reconsider the convictions and sentences of the [af-
fected] Mexican nationals” notwithstanding any state procedural default 
rules.26   
The first question the ICJ’s decision raised was whether its decision was 
directly enforceable in United States courts.27  The Supreme Court, by a 6-3 
vote, held that it was not.28  The Constitution states that treaties, like the Con-
stitution and federal laws, are the supreme law of the land and therefore 
trump state laws, including state procedural default rules.  The earliest deci-
sions of the Court, however, distinguished between treaties that are self-
executing – that is, they need no legislative action to make them effective as 
domestic law – and those that are not – that is, they require Congress to pass 
laws to make them effective as domestic law.29  In Medellin there were three 
treaties in question – the Optional Protocol (to the Convention on Consular 
Relations) Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, the United 
Nations Charter, and the ICJ Statute adopted by the United Nations to estab-
lish the ICJ.30  In accepting the Optional Protocol, “the United States agreed 
to submit disputes arising out of the Vienna Convention to the ICJ.”31  The 
Court, however, concluded that agreeing to submit disputes to the ICJ did not 
mean agreeing to be bound by the ICJ’s decisions.32  Article 94(1) of the 
Charter states that each member “undertakes to comply with the decision of 
the [ICJ] in any case to which it is a party.”33  The Court explained that this 
language did not contemplate a requirement that members enforce the judg-
  
 22. 552 U.S. 491, 499, 501 (2008). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 501.  
 25. Id.  
 26. Id. at 502-03 (alteration in original). 
 27. Id. at 498-99. 
 28. Id. at 504.  
 29. Id. at 504-05. 
 30. Id. at 506.  
 31. Id. at 507. 
 32. Id.  
 33. Id. at 508 (quoting U.N. Charter art. 94).  
5
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ments of the ICJ; it merely indicated a commitment by members to take some 
unspecified future action.34   
Finally, the ICJ statute by its terms indicates that the ICJ is a forum to 
arbitrate disputes between nations, here Mexico and the United States.35  The 
Supreme Court interpreted this to mean that the judgment of the ICJ did not 
create a legal right in Medellin to have his claim decided by the Texas court, 
even though that is what the ICJ declared.36  Without belaboring the argu-
ments on both sides, suffice it to say that the language of these international 
agreements could have been read differently.  Instead, the Court chose to read 
the agreements restrictively so that they were not self-executing, and there-
fore, the ICJ’s judgment had no domestic legal effect.37 The Court’s interpre-
tation of these agreements suggests that only the clearest indication in the 
language of a treaty would enable it to be considered self-executing. 
A critical concern expressed by the Court was that if a decision of the 
ICJ could be enforceable in federal and state courts, it  
would eliminate the option of noncompliance . . . , undermining the 
ability of the political branches to determine whether and how to 
comply with an ICJ judgment.  Those sensitive foreign policy deci-
sions would instead be transferred to state and federal courts 
charged with applying an ICJ judgment directly as domestic law.  
And those courts would not be empowered to decide whether to 
comply with the judgment – again, always regarded as an option 
by the political branches – any more than courts may consider 
whether to comply with any other species of domestic law.38 
This concern reflects the important national policy that compliance with 
foreign obligations, including legal obligations, should be left to the political 
branches of the United States government.  Decisions of international courts 
and organizations are not to be part of domestic law except as expressly pro-
vided by domestic legislation. 
There is an interesting juxtaposition between Medellin and the seminal 
case of Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee.39  In that case, the Supreme Court in an 
appeal from the highest court in the state of Virginia had interpreted a treaty 
with Great Britain and directed the state court to enter judgment in the state 
case in accordance with the Supreme Court’s interpretation.40  The Virginia 
court balked at this direction on the grounds that it was a separate sovereign 
  
 34. Id. at 508.  
 35. Id. at 511.  
 36. Id. at 511-12. 
 37. See id. at 551 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the relevant treaty provi-
sions are self-executing as applied to the ICJ judgment).  
 38. Id. at 511 (majority opinion). 
 39. 14 U.S. 304 (1816). 
 40. Id. at 313.  
6
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and could not be directed by a court of a different sovereign (the Supreme 
Court of the United States) anymore than it could be directed by the House of 
Lords as to its interpretation of the treaty.41  On appeal from that decision, the 
Supreme Court expounded on the theory that the Constitution had submitted 
Virginia to the Supreme Court’s supremacy as to matters of federal law, in-
cluding treaties.42  One could imagine the Medellin Court’s decision as 
equivalent to that of the Virginia court in Hunter’s Lessee, rejecting the no-
tion of a court of a different sovereign (the ICJ) being able to direct the law in 
courts of the United States.  Just as Virginia’s highest court did not read the 
Constitution as divesting it of its role as the final authority of the law applica-
ble in the state of Virginia, the Court in Medellin explicitly stated that the 
applicability of the ICJ’s judgments was for the Supreme Court to decide, not 
the ICJ.43   
In many ways, the Court’s decision in Medellin regarding the relation 
between decisions by international courts and organizations and domestic law 
is not surprising.  Nevertheless, it clearly signals a reluctance, if not outright 
hostility, to acceptance of some sort of global public law enforceable in do-
mestic courts.  In short, international law in United States courts largely re-
mains a political, not a legal, argument.   
Ultimately, the United States Constitution itself creates a barrier, or at 
least a limit, to the de-territorialization of law in the United States.  That is, 
even if the President of the United States were to make a treaty and the Sen-
ate were to ratify it as self-executing, federal and state courts would still be 
required to determine whether that treaty violated constitutional requirements.  
First, there may be some question as to whether there is a substantive limita-
tion on the positive authority of the United States to enter into treaties, as 
there is in terms of domestic legislation.  Congress can only legislate with 
respect to matters specified in the Constitution, largely what appears in Arti-
cle I, Section 8.  In Missouri v. Holland, the Court made clear that the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause may be used as authority to pass a law to carry into 
execution a treaty even though that law would not otherwise have been within 
Congress’s legislative authority. 44  Nevertheless, there are intimations in that 
case, as well as in an earlier case,45 that the national treaty power might be 
limited to matters of “national interest”46 or “properly the subject of negotia-
tion with a foreign country.”47   
  
 41. See id. at 321-22.  
 42. Id. at 328, 334.  
 43. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 506.  
 44. 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
 45. See De Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1890) (upholding the validity of a 
treaty with France allowing citizens of one country to inherit property from citizens of 
the other country). 
 46. Holland, 252 U.S. at 435. 
 47. De Geofroy, 133 U.S. at 267. 
7
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While courts may be expected to be highly deferential to the President 
and the Senate in determining whether a particular treaty meets those vague 
requirements, one might well imagine an international convention that could 
test those limits.  For example, imagine an international convention creating 
an international right of women to be protected from domestic violence, and 
imagine that Congress passes a law to implement that convention by making 
it a federal crime for persons to subject women to domestic violence.  The 
Supreme Court has already held that a federal law that created a federal pri-
vate damages remedy for persons who engage in gender motivated violence 
was unconstitutional as beyond Congress’ powers.48  And here, while such an 
international convention is certainly plausible, it is less clear why or how this 
subject – domestic violence wholly within the borders of one of the states – is 
“properly a subject of negotiation with a foreign country.”  Or imagine an 
international convention declaring capital punishment a violation of interna-
tional human rights, and imagine a Congress that passes a law implementing 
that convention by making capital punishment unlawful in the states.  Again, 
absent such a treaty, Congress would almost certainly not have the power to 
make such a law, and, again, it is not clear why capital punishment carried 
out in one of the states as a general matter is “properly a subject of negotia-
tion with a foreign country.”   
Even if the Court found that as a facial matter a treaty might be valid, a 
law passed by Congress to enforce that treaty might in an “as applied” chal-
lenge be found unconstitutional. That issue is currently before the Supreme 
Court in Bond v. United States.49  In this case a woman tried to poison a 
friend who was pregnant with a child fathered by the woman’s husband by 
putting a poison on the other woman’s mailbox.50  Because that poison, which 
caused only a minor rash on the victim, was a toxic chemical, Ms. Bond was 
prosecuted under a statute prohibiting the use of a “chemical weapon,” a stat-
ute enacted by Congress to implement the 1993 Chemical Weapons Conven-
tion.51  The question raised is whether a law passed by Congress to implement 
a treaty can be constitutionally applied in a situation having no connection to 
a matter “properly a subject of negotiation with a foreign country.”52  If the 
answer is no, this decision would provide another barrier or restriction on 
United States enforcement of international conventions. 
There is a second, and more likely, potential constitutional problem with 
United States enforcement of possible international conventions.  It is widely 
accepted that the rights afforded persons in the United States by the Constitu-
  
 48. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 49. 133 S. Ct. 978 (2013) (granting cert.).  
 50. See United States v. Bond, 581 F.3d 128, 131-32 (3d Cir. 2009), rev’d, 131 
S.Ct. 2355 (2011). 
 51. Id. at 132. 
 52. See id. at 134.  
8
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tion cannot be abridged by treaty.53  In the United States, the First Amend-
ment’s protection of Free Speech extends to speech that demeans a group on 
racial or religious grounds.54  Nevertheless, as recently as 2010, the United 
Nations Human Rights Council passed a resolution that condemned defama-
tion of religion.55  An international convention requiring prohibition of such 
defamation is not unthinkable, but it would clearly be unconstitutional and 
therefore unenforceable in the United States.  
It might be noted that the United States is not alone in insisting that its 
national constitution trumps international agreements.  The German Constitu-
tional Court, in a case concerning Germany’s ability to enter into the Lisbon 
Treaty (which expands the authority of the European Union), specified a 
number of areas in which Germany’s Basic Law limits the ability of the na-
tion to cede its sovereignty to the EU.56  This pushback against de-
territorialization has been sporadic among the EU states, but it is endemic in 
the United States.   
III. CONCLUSION 
De-territorialization of public law is in direct tension with notions of 
strong federalism.  In the American version of federalism, the territoriality of 
the law is of great importance, which is one reason why choice of law ques-
tions are both interesting and challenging.  The Erie doctrine57 likewise re-
flects the importance of the territoriality of state law even in federal courts.  
Moreover, the fact that the United States continues to have fifty separate laws 
for contracts, torts, criminal law, family law, property, and administrative 
law, each operable in its own state, testifies to the vitality of that territoriali-
zation.  The United States’ history as a federal republic, therefore, leads it 
generally to view law as territorial and inextricably linked to the sovereign 
  
 53. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957) (noting that there is nothing 
in the Supremacy Clause intimating “that treaties and laws enacted pursuant to them 
do not have to comply with the provisions of the Constitution.”). 
 54. Although Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952), which upheld a group 
libel law has never been explicitly overruled, lower courts have uniformly found it to 
be no longer good law.  See, e.g., Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1205 (7th Cir. 
1978).  
 55. Human Rights Council Res. 13/16, 13th Sess., Apr. 15, 2010, Combatting 
Defamation of Religions, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/13/16, available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/13session/A.HRC.RES.13.16_
AEV.pdf.   
 56. See Ralf Grahn, German Ruling on EU Lisbon Treaty (in English), GRAHN L. 
BLOG (June 30, 2009), http://grahnlaw.blogspot.com/2009/06/german-ruling-on-eu-
lisbon-treaty-in.html.   
 57. See Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-79 (1938). 
9
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nation or state that enacted it.58  It comes as no surprise then that international 
or global law divorced from such territoriality is met with some skepticism.  
Nevertheless, when international law is perceived as benefitting the 
United States or, even better, providing it with a comparative advantage, the 
United States has been a leader in promoting international law.  This is why 
the second half of the Twentieth Century, perhaps the high point of United 
States’ international supremacy, was exceptional.  In short, for the United 
States, international law was simply a means of furthering its own interests.  
“Free trade,” when you were the undoubted superpower in international trade, 
was not an academic issue of what was best for the world; it was simply what 
best served your own economic interests.  Thus,  the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade, which generally eliminated non-tariff trade barriers, pri-
marily benefited the United States because of its extensive international trade.  
Today the United States is a leader in attempting to create an international 
intellectual property rights regime that would protect American advantages in 
intellectual property.59   
When, however, international law is perceived to no longer serve the 
United States’ interests, or even that it no longer preserves United States’ 
advantages, then the United States opposes international law.  The Kyoto 
Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,60 
the international treaty that imposed greenhouse gas emission limitations on 
developed nations, is probably the best example of this.  Despite a general 
recognition that, as flawed as it was, the Protocol would have positive effects 
for the world at large, the United States was never close to ratifying it, pre-
cisely because it was viewed as not benefitting the United States in particular 
and would impose greater costs on the United States than on many other na-
tions.61   
In conclusion, the history of the United States is one fraught with dis-
trust of international ties and obligations.  This cultural background is en-
hanced by the nature of the American federal system which places a strong 
emphasis on the territorialization of law.  These combined obstacles to em-
bracing transnational public law are overcome in the United States only when 
the United States believes that it will derive a particular advantage from the 
internationalization of the law, not just a general benefit from existing in a 
better world.  Where that is not the case, as it increasingly is not, one can 
expect the United States to oppose transnational law.  
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